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§4.10

Unfair Prejudice, Confusion, Delay, Collateral

The first and most frequently asserted ground of exclusion in FRE 403 is “unfair prejudice.”
The qualification “unfair” was included out of recognition that relevant evidence is by nature
prejudicial to the opposing party. 1 The Rule expects courts to distinguish between prejudice
resulting from the reasonable persuasive force of evidence and prejudice resulting from
excessive emotional or irrational effects that could distort the accuracy and integrity of the
factfinding process. 2
Unfair prejudice
FRE 403 encompasses two analytically distinct but frequently overlapping forms of unfair
prejudice. The first is the injection of undue emotionalism into the proceeding arousing hostility,
anger, or sympathy on the part of the jury. 3 The second is the likelihood that the jury will misuse
the evidence in some way or give it undue weight. 4
Appeal to emotion
Because most human assessments rest at least in part on emotion, no attempt is made to exclude
emotion from the trial or even all evidence likely to evoke an emotional response. Rather FRE 403
provides a trial judge with the ability to regulate the nature and extent of emotional appeals during
trial.
Thus courts may exclude evidence that is found to be “inflammatory,” “shocking,” or
“sensational.” 5 Evidence may also be excluded where it evokes the anger or punitive impulses of

§4.10 1. Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1988) (all relevant evidence is
“prejudicial” in that it “may prejudice the party against whom it is admitted”).
2. Westfield Insurance Co. v. Harris, 134 F.3d 608, 613 (4th Cir. 1998) (“prejudice” means “a genuine risk that the
emotions of the jury will be excited to irrational behavior”). But see Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson,
Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?,
1983 Wis. L. Rev. 1147 (questioning ability of courts to assess prejudicial effect of evidence).
3. United States v. Huyck, 849 F.3d 432 (8th Cir. 2017) (describing unfair prejudice in terms of evidence “so
inflammatory on its face” that it would divert jury from material issues).
4. See ACN, FRE 403 (unfair prejudice is “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one”). See United States v. Brandon, 521 F.3d 1019, 1026 (8th Cir. 2008)
(unfair prejudice refers not to “legitimate probative force” of evidence, but to “its capacity to lure a jury into
declaring guilt for an improper reason”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 314.
5. Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 128-132 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (abuse of discretion for trial judge to
admit “highly inflammatory” information from defendants’ personnel files).

the jury, 6 unfairly puts a party or witness in a negative light, 7 appeals to the jury’s prejudices, 8 or
gives rise to overly strong sympathetic reactions. 9 But sometimes evidence that is “egregious” is
admitted on the theory that it has even greater probative value, such as where evidence of vicious
prior beatings by police officers is offered to show a municipality’s tolerance of the practice. 10
Various forms of demonstrative evidence often have strong emotional impact justifying careful
regulation under FRE 403. 11
Limiting emotional impact
The fact that certain evidence may be emotionally discomforting to the jury does not mean it
should be excluded. 12 Thus gory photographs depicting injuries of the plaintiff are often received
in personal injury or wrongful death cases on the issue of damages. 13 Photographs of dead bodies
or injured victims are also often admitted in criminal cases, 14 although exclusion is more likely
6. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1142 (7th Cir. 1985) (in suit for invasion of privacy by
woman pictured in Hustler magazine, trial court erred under FRE 403 in admitting slide show of 128 of magazine’s
“worst pictures”).
7. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (in prosecution for assault with dangerous weapon and
possession by convicted felon of firearm, error to admit copy of defendant’s prior conviction for felony assault
causing bodily injury when defendant was willing to stipulate that he was a convicted felon and to have jury
instructed that this element of offense was proven); United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 156-158 (4th Cir. 1990)
(in prosecution for trying to board plane with a firearm, reversible error to introduce evidence that defendant fit drug
courier profile).
8. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 9, 1982, 767 F.2d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir. 1985)
(where plaintiff sought damages for death of wife in airline crash, proper to exclude evidence that plaintiff had
venereal disease; because plaintiff admitted he had once been unfaithful to wife, evidence “would have proved
nothing more”).
9. United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1991) (no error to exclude evidence that defendant’s son had
cerebral palsy and that defendant had devoted life to son’s care), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1220.
10. Foley v. City of Lowell, Mass., 948 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1991) (where a plaintiff attempts to show similar prior
acts of a municipality tolerating police misconduct, “egregiousness is a hallmark of probative value”).
11. See §9.31.
12. Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 365 (5th Cir. 1980) (no unfair prejudice in allowing plaintiff to
demonstrate procedure for removing and replacing artificial eye).
13. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 n.9 (6th Cir. 1990) (in civil rights action against prison guards arising out
of death of inmate, no error to admit photographs of decedent’s body).
14. United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 61 (1st Cir. 2013) (terrorism-related evidence is often emotionally

when the nature or extent of injuries is not an element of the prosecution’s case. 15
The court has authority under FRE 403 and 611(a) to minimize the emotional impact of such
evidence, for example, by limiting the number of photographs introduced, requiring that they be in
black and white rather than color, or requiring that a drawing or diagram be offered in lieu of a
photograph. In order to make exclusion more likely, the objecting party can offer to stipulate to all
matters properly provable by such evidence, although the court is not bound to accept such a
stipulation. 16
Limited purpose
The danger of jury misuse of evidence arises most often with evidence admitted for a limited
purpose under FRE 105. The jury may be instructed to consider it only on a particular issue or only
against a particular party. However, sometimes the evidence has such powerful or dramatic impact
that it is unrealistic to expect the jury to comply with a limiting instruction. 17 In such situations,
the court has discretion to exclude the evidence under FRE 403. 18
Evidence bringing out the criminal background of a defendant 19 or why he was being

charged, even “alarming” and “blood curdling,” but “this emotional overlay is directly related to the nature of the
crimes,” and it should not surprise defendant that conspiracy to help terrorist organizations kill Americans involves
“evidence offensive to the sensibilities of civilized people”).
15. Compare United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2001) (admitting photographs of victim’s mutilated
hand, which “related to the charge of mayhem”) with State v. Wilson, 310 S.E.2d 486, 487-488 (W. Va. 1983)
(gruesome photographs are not per se excludable but are presumptively prejudicial and state must show that they
have “essential value” to the case; reversible error to admit such photographs here).
16. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208, 1217 (1983) (exhibits that have the tendency to cause prejudice
“may often be admissible despite offers to stipulate” because testimony “may be difficult to comprehend without
photographs, or exhibits may corroborate or illustrate controverted testimony”). For a discussion of offers to
stipulate, see §4.9, supra.
17. Cf. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 103-104 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (rejecting use of deceased wife’s
statement “Dr. Shepard has poisoned me” for limited purpose of showing her will to live and unlikelihood of her
committing suicide; “Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating
clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds. It is for ordinary minds, and not for
psychoanalysts, that the rules of evidence are framed.”).
18. See ACN, FRE 105 (“availability and effectiveness” of giving a limiting instruction “must be taken into
consideration in reaching a decision whether to exclude for unfair prejudice under Rule 403”).
19. United States v. Bland, 908 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1990) (in prosecution for being an ex-felon in possession of a
firearm, it was error to admit evidence that basis of arrest warrant was the torture murder of a seven-year-old girl,
because it might suggest that acquittal meant “releasing an exceedingly dangerous child molester and killer”).

investigated 20 is often found unfairly prejudicial under FRE 403. Evidence of other crimes or
wrongs committed by a party may be excluded under FRE 403 even where such evidence
otherwise qualifies for admission under FRE 404(b). 21
Evidence of a gun or other weapon seized from the accused at the time of arrest may be admitted
where the weapon is an element of the charged crime or was allegedly used during commission of
the charged offense. 22 Otherwise such evidence is generally excluded as unfairly prejudicial, 23
although some decisions admit weapons found in a defendant’s possession to support charges of
organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking. 24
Confusing and misleading
Evidence may be excluded where it is likely to confuse or mislead the jury, such as by
distracting them with immaterial or side issues. 25 There is considerable overlap between the
dangers of confusing the issues and misleading the jury, and courts often cite both dangers without
attempting to distinguish between them.
Examples of evidence found confusing and misleading include evidence about developments in
related legal proceedings, 26 the failure to prosecute other parties, 27 reports containing ambiguous
20. United States v. Lamberty, 778 F.2d 59, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1985) (in prosecution against postmaster for improperly
opening package, reversible error to admit “highly prejudicial” testimony of postal inspector that defendant was
being investigated because of “information” that defendant was “taking out packages which had been missent”).
21. See §4.16, infra.
22. United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603, 611 (1st Cir. 1975) (upon proof that a weapon was used during bank
robbery, court may permit introduction of that weapon or a weapon of a similar kind to show identity), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 987.
23. United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721, 725 (10th Cir. 1977) (“The courts have quite uniformly condemned the
introduction in evidence of testimony concerning dangerous weapons, even though found in the possession of a
defendant, which have nothing to do with the crime charged.”).
24. United States v. Green, 887 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1989) (no error to admit proof of firearms, which are “tools of
the trade” in drug trafficking).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 462 (4th Cir. 2014) (in trial for selling counterfeit drugs,
blocking questions on “gray-market” drugs, which would “confuse, mislead, and waste time,” distracting jury from
“principal purpose,” which was to assess defendant’s “subjective belief and actual knowledge”).
26. Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1346-1348 (5th Cir. 1978) (in products liability action where decedent
was killed when gas tank exploded after car rear-ended by another driver, error to allow manufacturer to introduce
guilty plea of other driver to involuntary manslaughter because such evidence was likely to be “confusing” and
“potentially misleading” to jury).
27. United States v. Steffen, 641 F.2d 591, 596 (8th Cir. 1981) (excluding evidence offered by defendant that other

legal terminology, 28 and private agreements between defendants purporting to apportion any
liability imposed. 29
Inculpating third party
An important and controversial application of this ground of exclusion is to prevent defendants
from attempting to show that a third person committed the crime for which they are charged unless
the court finds the proffered evidence sufficiently probative. 30 Although courts understandably
seek to prevent improper attempts to divert the attention of the jury and put a nonparty on trial on
the basis of speculative evidence, 31 judicial caution is warranted because of the due process
dangers of excluding evidence of third party culpability that is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
in the minds of the jury about defendant’s own guilt. 32
Waste of time, delay, cumulative
FRE 403 permits exclusion based on considerations of “undue delay, wasting time or
persons alleged to be involved were not prosecuted), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 943.
28. Pucalik v. Holiday Inns, 777 F.2d 359, 363 (7th Cir. 1985) (in wrongful death action arising out of killing of
security guard, no error to exclude government document finding that guard died “in the line of duty” and therefore
was acting as “a licensee, not an invitee”; document was “conclusory and not based on findings under Indiana law”
and its probative value was “clearly outweighed by the potential for confusing and misleading the jury”).
29. In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Intl. Airport on June 24, 1975, 635 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1980) (in
litigation arising out of air crash, no error to exclude evidence that United States and airline had agreed to a 40-60
split of any damages awarded; court finds that such evidence “would have only served to mislead the jurors and
confuse the issues”).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1990) (excluding evidence of insufficiently similar
crimes by third person as likely to confuse and mislead jury). See generally McCord, “But Perry Mason Made It
Look So Easy!”: The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest That Someone Else Is
Guilty, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 917 (1996).
31. United States v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (no abuse of discretion to exclude evidence of
possible third party guilt because it was speculative); Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983) (court must
balance legitimate interests of defendant to present a defense against interests of state in fair and reliable trial; where
state interest is strong, “only the exclusion of critical, reliable and highly probative evidence will violate due
process”).
32. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (constitutional error to exclude evidence of third party guilt
merely because prosecution’s case against defendant seemed strong). See also Everhart, Putting a Burden of
Production on the Defendant Before Admitting Evidence That Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged: Is It
Constitutional?, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 272 (1997). On the constitutional right to produce evidence, see §5.5, infra.

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Such grounds for exclusion can be viewed as a
“concession to the shortness of life” 33 as well as an acknowledgment of the limited resources of
the judicial system. Pretrial conferences under FRCP 16 share the same goal of avoiding
unnecessary proof at trial. 34
“Needlessly” cumulative
It is sometimes difficult to decide whether evidence is “needlessly” cumulative because it is
hard to know how much evidence on a particular issue is required to convince the jury. Litigants
are generally allowed to call more than one witness on a point and to introduce corroborative or
duplicative evidence. But under FRE 403 courts clearly have discretion to limit the number of
witnesses called, 35 the number of examples on the same point, 36 and generally to prevent
unnecessary repetition. 37
Courts may exclude documentary evidence offered on a point that has already been established
by testimony 38 and similarly may refuse to require the playing of a tape recording on matters
already adequately established by other evidence. 39 However, the trial judge should not become
so concerned about keeping up the pace of the trial that a litigant is prevented from presenting
evidence critical to his claim or defense. 40
33. Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 28, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (1887) (Holmes, J.).
34. FRCP 16(c)(4) and (15) (subjects for consideration at pretrial conferences include “avoidance of unnecessary
proof and of cumulative evidence” and “an order establishing a reasonable limit on the time allowed for presenting
evidence”).
35. United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 272 (5th Cir. 1983) (after eight character witnesses had already testified,
trial judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding similar testimony from ten additional proposed witnesses), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 937.
36. United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 22 (2d Cir. 1979) (limiting evidence to two out of eight examples of
defendant’s alleged cohort acting unlawfully on his own), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082.
37. Melton v. Deere & Co., 887 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1989) (in personal injury suit against manufacturer of
farm combine, no error for trial court to admit evidence of three similar accidents and exclude six others because
court has discretion to exclude “unnecessarily cumulative” evidence).
38. United States v. Lomax, 598 F.2d 582, 584-585 (10th Cir. 1979) (proper to refuse to receive stolen check as an
exhibit to impeach prosecution witness where witness already admitted stealing the check).
39. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1348 (9th Cir. 1977) (court refused to allow playing of one hour and
forty-five-minute tape of psychiatric interview of defendant; tape found needlessly cumulative), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1000.
40. Bower v. O’Hara, 759 F.2d 1117, 1123-1124 (3d Cir. 1985) (error to exclude evidence “plainly relevant to the
issue of damages” where the trial court ruling “seemed to have been prompted chiefly if not solely by the court’s

Collateral
Although not listed as a ground for exclusion in FRE 403, evidence can be excluded if it is
“collateral,” which may encompass several grounds listed in the Rule including unfairly
prejudicial, confusing, misleading, waste of time and undue delay. “Collateral” is a durable term
carried forward from common law tradition. In a general sense, the term describes testimony and
other evidence far removed from what is important or central in a case. Such proof is usually seen
as tangential, unimportant, or trivial, hence distracting or time-consuming, and often prejudicial.
In practice, the term “collateral” appears in several specific settings where it describes important
limits on various evidential doctrines.
First, it is often said that impeachment on collateral points is improper. The central idea is that
evidence should not be admitted if it tends only to contradict or refute other evidence that is
unimportant in a case. Contradiction is one of the recognized methods of impeachment, and in this
setting the term “collateral” has developed into a hard-edged limit with well-defined meaning.
Putting aside details, the idea is that counterproof may be admitted to contradict only testimony or
other evidence that really counts. 41 If a witness says he was wearing a coat when he saw the
accident, proof that he was in his shirtsleeves might well be excluded as impeachment on a
collateral point.
Another recognized method of impeachment involves the use of prior statements by a witness
that conflict with his testimony. Here too it is sometimes said that impeachment on collateral points
is improper although the limit is not so carefully observed in this setting. 42
In connection with impeaching attacks that seek to show bias or defects in mental or sensory
capacity, extrinsic evidence is generally admissible. Essentially that means that one witness may
be called to testify on such facts as they relate to another witness, and this outcome is often
explained by the comment that such issues and such evidence are not collateral. 43
Second, it is often said that the “open door” doctrine does not pave the way for evidence on
collateral points. Essentially, the idea of the open door doctrine is that affirmative party strategies
in offering evidence or questioning witnesses bear importantly on what other parties may do by
way of reply or counterproof. But when such strategies result in introducing evidence that is
unimportant and likely to have little effect, or when counterproof that might refute such evidence
would introduce risks of prejudice that are out of all proportion to the original proof, the
counterproof may properly be excluded, and often it is labeled as collateral. 44
impatience about the length of trial”).
41. See the discussion in §6.47, infra. In connection with attempts to show a witness is untruthful, extrinsic evidence
of acts by the witness is excludable (testimony by another witness), and courts sometimes explain the point by
saying extrinsic evidence is inadmissible on such collateral points. See FRE 608(b) and the discussion in §6.27,
infra.
42. See the discussion in §6.40, infra.
43. See the discussion of bias in §6.19 and the discussion of capacity in §6.21, infra.
44. See generally the discussion of the open door doctrine in §1.4 and §4.2, supra.

Underlying these uses of the term “collateral” are the concerns embodied in FRE 403. Far
preferable to quick and careless use of the term is a more direct explanation of underlying concerns.
If the concern is that probative worth is slight when compared to the complexity of the argument
or issue, or the time required to explore the matter, it helps to say that. If the concern is that the
evidence, while relevant on the point in question, has an unintentional spillover effect posing a
risk of serious prejudice to the parties or humiliation or harassment for the witness, it helps to say
that as well. Occasionally courts exhibit impatience with use of the label alone. 45

45. United States v. Robinson, 530 F.2d 1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (analysis is cursory when judge comments that
evidence is only collateral in impeaching character; preferable to confront problem by “acknowledging and
weighing” prejudice and probative worth).

